“William L. McClure” , “Cindy S. Elmquist”
Jorgenson, Siegel, McClure & Flegel, LLP
1100 Alma Street, Suite 210
Menlo Park, CA 94025
“David C. Bertini” , “Matt L. Milde”
The City of Menlo Park
701 Laurel St. Menlo Park, CA 94025
Dear Mr McClure,
I am lodging herewith an appeal of your denial of my application for a special event permit, by outlining its purpose and scope and responding to all of your objections in order.
I have been protesting NEA’s ongoing support of its venture partner Min Zhu and its coverup of his incestuous child rape since 2004. In the course of the ensuing litigation and subject to demands by Menlo Park city authorities, I have been forced to relocate my protests from the immediate vicinity of NEA’s headquarters, to the narrow strip of public grounds surrounding the 16 private acres of the Rosewood Sand Hill compound located at 2825 Sand Hill Rd, Menlo Park, CA 94025. The median strip identified in his current application affords the only possible location for staging my protest in clear view of the NEA headquarters. My open display of firearms is germane to the message that responds to the death threats made against me and my family in the names and on the behalves of individuals and business entities sponsored and supported by NEA. The continual and open-ended nature of my protest responds to NEA’s long-standing refusal to account for its responsibility in supporting and covering up the lawless conduct of its associates.
As to your claim that my application is incomplete, attached please find a map of the area in question, which clearly designates the specific and modest boundaries of my special event. That is all that the City of Menlo Park (“the City”) can reasonably expect and require to analyze whether traffic control will be necessary or what other conditions might be necessary as part of its approval of my application. As suggested before, and witnessed by my past appearances in your jurisdiction, my use of sound and lighting equipment is subject to our ongoing mutual agreement on their time, place, and manner parameters. If you have any specific requests in this regard, please make them with no further ado, bearing in mind that all restrictions on my expressive conduct must be (1) content-neutral, (2) narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest, and (3) leave open ample alternative channels for communication. (See Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983).) As resolved as I am to see my task through, I remain open to all reasonable accommodations.
While the First Amendment “does not guarantee the right to communicate one’s views at all times and places or in any manner that may be desired” (Heffron v. Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640 (1981), it protects the right of every citizen to “reach the minds of willing listeners [and] to do so, there must be opportunity to win their attention.” (Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703 (2000).) My presence on NEA’s grounds has been ruled out as a part of settling its trespass claims against me five years ago. The currently proposed location of my performance therefore represents my only remaining opportunity to address directly the public associated or connected with it. Please bear in mind the foregoing authorities in your attempts to deny me my right to speak in this way and venue.
With respect to the application not meeting the criteria for a special event, the City lacks the authority to define a special event subject to its permitting requirements, beyond ensuring that it does not disrupt the ordinary use of its public spaces. It is true that I am proposing a media production of a one-man protest. My primary aim, however, is to exhibit my media to the thousands of daily passerby on Sand Hill Road, even as I stream their reactions online. My communication needs to be both physically proximate for them, and available over the Internet for more distant audiences. This project falls squarely within the ambit of Constitutional protection of political speech. My production is no less deserving of such protection for being modestly scaled. Thus Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 704 (1972): “Liberty of the press is the right of the lonely pamphleteer who uses carbon paper or a mimeograph just as much as of the large metropolitan publisher who utilizes the latest photocomposition methods.”
While the First Amendment literally forbids the abridgment only of “speech”, the Supreme Court has long recognized that its protection does not end at the spoken or written word, even as it acknowledged that not all conduct intended by the person engaging therein to express an idea is so protected. (See United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).) For such conduct may be “sufficiently imbued with elements of communication to fall within the scope of the First and Fourteenth Amendments”. (See Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405 (1974).) ”In deciding whether particular conduct possesses sufficient communicative elements to bring the First Amendment into play, we have asked whether [a]n intent to convey a particularized message was present, and [whether] the likelihood was great that the message would be understood by those who viewed it.” (See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989).) In sum, according to the Supreme Court’s test for expressive conduct, known as the Spence-Johnson test, an action is protected by the First Amendment if: (1) the speaker-actor intends for the conduct to express a particularized message; and (2) that message would be understood by others. In the course of reaffirming the Spence-Johnson test in Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557 (1995), the Supreme Court ruled that “a narrow, succinctly articulable message is not a condition of constitutional protection, which if confined to expressions conveying a ‘particularized message,’ […] would never reach the unquestionably shielded painting of Jackson Pollock, music of Arnold Schönberg, or Jabberwocky verse of Lewis Carroll.” In the course of my protest, the expressive content of openly carried firearms presented as a means of defense both warranted and necessitated by my circumstances, will be bolstered by the concurrent multimedia presentation of the evidence of threats I received in the names and on the behalves of NEA’s associates, the damage that they claim to have inflicted on my family, and their history of unlawful violence. Your study of my past displays should suffice to reassure you that my painstakingly particularized message will be infinitely easier to parse than The She-Wolf, Pierrot Lunaire, or “Jabberwocky”.
This brings me to the matter of my venue. Streets and sidewalks are “prototypal” examples of public fora, and have immemorially been considered a rightful place for public discourse. (See Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496 (1939.) Public fora “have achieved a special status in our law”, for they “represent areas within which tolerance for inhibitions on speech, petition, and assembly is at a minimum.” The government therefore “bear[s] an extraordinarily heavy burden to regulate speech in such locales.” (See N.A.A.C.P. v. City of Richmond, 743 F.2d 1346 (9th Cir. 1984).) “And just as streets and sidewalks are prototypical examples of public fora, political speech related to current events is the prototypical example of protected speech.” (See American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee v. City of Dearborn (“AAADC”), 418 F.3d 600 (6th Cir. 2005).) In the matter at hand, the current event at issue is NEA’s ongoing financial support of its child-raping protégé Min Zhu. As long as I do not “realistically present serious traffic, safety, and competing-use concerns beyond those presented on a daily basis by ordinary use of the streets and sidewalks,” you cannot require me to obtain a permit for exercising my Constitutional rights, let alone deny its issuance. (See Santa Monica Food Not Bombs v. City of Santa Monica (“SMFNB”), 450 F.3d 1022 (9th Cir. 2006).) Moreover, I generally do not need a permit to hold a rally or a march on public grounds while obeying traffic laws. (See SMFNB, 450 F.3d at 1039, 1040-43; AAADC, 418 F.3d at 608.) Thus I am asking for nothing more nor less than your approval of my rightful, conspicuous presence on public grounds in full compliance with all applicable laws.
As to my compliance with traffic laws, to repeat myself, I do not intend use any City street or right of way. The California Vehicle Code Section 525 defines the right of way as “the privilege of the immediate use of the highway”. In this regard, the right of way in the median island, where I intend to conduct my performance, is ordinarily reserved for pedestrians alone. The small part of the median island that I intend to occupy will leave plenty of room for the passage of vehicles in any emergency, e.g. as regards tow trucks allowed to do so pursuant to CVC Section 21719. I do not intend to present any visual impairment to oncoming traffic and vehicles traveling on Sand Hill Road. As to presenting a visual distraction, I am well within my First Amendment rights to do so in a rightful place for public discourse, within which tolerance for your inhibitions on speech, petition, and assembly is at a minimum.
To clarify the nature of the proposed multimedia production in the context of my one-man protest, I am not intending it for the filming of a movie, and therefore you may not require me to obtain a film production permit. Kindly recall that I have borne the brunt of abusive and oppressive conduct by the City of Menlo Park Police Department (“the police”) since the inception of my protests a decade ago. This abuse and oppression included, without limitation, illegal surveillance and harassment of myself and my associates, arbitrary imposition of constraints on our performance, and participation in my malicious prosecution in San Mateo Superior Court, wherein the prosecutor expressly and unequivocally acknowledged on court record that she was seeking my criminal conviction on behalf of NEA. Accordingly, I would not dare to appear in your jurisdiction without recording each of my interactions with your minions, for my security and theirs alike. And I have every right to make this recording without asking or paying for your permission.
As explained by Evan Bernick and Paul Larkin in “Filming the Watchmen: Why the First Amendment Protects Your Right to Film the Police in Public Places”, lower federal courts have generally said that the First Amendment protects a right to record and photograph law enforcement in public view. Some restrictions may be constitutional, but simply prohibiting the recording because the person is recording the police cannot be constitutional. While the Supreme Court is yet to consider this question, such is the general view in the federal appellate decisions that have done so. An apparent exception is a recent federal trial court decision in Fields v. City of Philadelphia and Geraci v. City of Philadelphia, which takes a different, narrower approach: There is no constitutional right to videorecord police, the court says, when the act of recording is unaccompanied by “challenge or criticism” of the police conduct. But even under this restrictive standard, I remain well within my rights to videorecord at will, without warning, and regardless of permission, all my public performances in your jurisdiction, for the sake of safety and transparency. In light of the history of my peaceful protests being subjected to oppressive scrutiny and censure by the City authorities, I am planning to exercise my rights under the First Amendment to film my appearances there, for the express purpose of mounting a potential challenge and criticism of the police conduct in the event of further obstructions mounted by Menlo Park. According to Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147 (1969) the discretion of public officials charged with permitting First Amendment activity must be limited by “narrow, objective, and definite standards.” It therefore falls upon the City to identify such standards that deny my rights or subject them to permitting requirements.
Lastly, your concern is that it is illegal to open carry a firearm in the State of California is likewise misdirected. It is none of your business to seek or scrutinize any logical nexus or legitimate purpose of carrying a firearm the proposed event. I am well within my rights in carrying a firearm, either openly or concealed, in the course of an entertainment event, as its authorized participant, as protected by the Constitution of the United States, and clearly warranted by law in the state of California.
Thus California Penal Code Section 25400 (a) (2): “A person is guilty of carrying a concealed firearm when the person does any of the following: […] Carries concealed upon the person any pistol, revolver, or other firearm capable of being concealed upon the person.” Whereas P.C. Section 25510 qualifies this ban: “Section 25400 does not apply to, or affect, any of the following: (a) The possession of a firearm by an authorized participant in a motion picture, television, or video production, or an entertainment event, when the participant lawfully uses the firearm as part of that production or event, or while going directly to, or coming directly from, that production or event. (b) The transportation of a firearm by an authorized employee or agent of a supplier of firearms when going directly to, or coming directly from, a motion picture, television, or video production, or an entertainment event, for the purpose of providing that firearm to an authorized participant to lawfully use as a part of that production or event.” Please be assured that I intend to authorize myself as a participant in my own entertainment event.
A similar exemption applies to the ban on the open carrying of an unloaded handgun. Thus P.C. Section 26350 (a) (1): “A person is guilty of openly carrying an unloaded handgun when that person carries upon his or her person an exposed and unloaded handgun outside a vehicle while in or on any of the following: (A) A public place or public street in an incorporated city or city and county.” Whereas P.C. Section 26375 qualifies this ban: “Section 26350 does not apply to, or affect, the open carrying of an unloaded handgun by an authorized participant in, or an authorized employee or agent of a supplier of firearms for, a motion picture, television or video production, or entertainment event, when the participant lawfully uses the handgun as part of that production or event, as part of rehearsing or practicing for participation in that production or event, or while the participant or authorized employee or agent is at that production or event, or rehearsal or practice for that production or event.”
Similar exemptions apply to long guns. Thus P.C. Section 26400 (a): “A person is guilty of carrying an unloaded firearm that is not a handgun in an incorporated city or city and county when that person carries upon his or her person an unloaded firearm that is not a handgun outside a vehicle while in the incorporated city or city and county.” Whereas P.C. Section 26405 qualifies this ban: “Section 26400 does not apply to, or affect, the carrying of an unloaded firearm that is not a handgun in any of the following circumstances: […] (r) By an authorized participant in, or an authorized employee or agent of a supplier of firearms for, a motion picture, television or video production, or entertainment event, when the participant lawfully uses that firearm as part of that production or event, as part of rehearsing or practicing for participation in that production or event, or while the participant or authorized employee or agent is at that production or event, or rehearsal or practice for that production or event.” In short, conspicuous display of otherwise legally possessed unloaded firearms in the course of my entertainment event is my Constitutional right under the First Amendment, expressly protected by California statutes. In the event, these firearms will include, without limitation, a pair of H&K P7M13 handguns, an LRB M25 designated marksman rifle, a Winchester M97 trench shotgun with an M1917 Remington bayonet, and a semiautomatic, belt-fed, tripod mounted Browning M1919a4, all conspicuously adjoined by ample supplies of ammunition.
I trust that I have met your concerns over the completeness of my application. Please acknowledge the receipt of this email and approve my application at your earliest convenience. To repeat myself, we are equally willing to negotiate or litigate. Please refer to Lefemine v. Wideman, 568 U.S. ____ (2012), which held that a plaintiff who secured a permanent injunction but no monetary damages was a “prevailing party” under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 and could receive attorney fees, where the injunction ordered the defendant officials to change their behavior in a way that directly benefited the plaintiff, who could thereafter engage in demonstrations without fear of sanctions with which police had previously threatened him. As public officials, NEA’s minions among your City colleagues enjoy qualified immunity from damages suits if they violate my rights, but only as long as they do not violate “clearly established” law. “If the law was clearly established, the immunity defense ordinarily should fail, since a reasonably competent public official should know the law governing his conduct.” (See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982).) In short, your personal liability will be richly borne out by the foregoing statutes and case law. The last issue that remains to be litigated conclusively is the expressive content of openly carried firearms. In this connection, please refer to Nordyke v. King, 563 F. 3d 439 (9th Cir. 2009), wherein the state of California tacitly conceded the issue even before the Supreme Court incorporated the Second Amendment in McDonald v. Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010). Long story short, if you continue siding with NEA’s minions, I will win at the City’s certain and considerable expense.
7576 Willow Glen Rd, Los Angeles, CA 90046, U.S.A. | voice:323.363.1860 | fax:323.410.2373
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